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Vietnam was a searing experience, even for those of us who were
predominantly passive observers on the sidelines. Twenty years ago, as
students chanted and tear gas canisters exploded, I struggled to convince
myself that a young law teacher's first obligation was to prepare and teach
his class-and that somehow, despite the hellish jungle nightmare por-
trayed by the media and the seething discontent on the University of Wis-
consin campus, it remained important to get my job done.
Inevitably those images receded as the war ended. American society
seemed to engage, for almost a decade, in repressing the bad dream of
Vietnam. But reminders eventually began to surface in the popular cul-
ture, as a succession of surrealistic cinematic portrayals attest-depictions
including The Deer Hunter (1978), Apocalypse Now (1979), Platoon
(1986), and Full Metal Jacket (1987). And at about the same time, the
veterans themselves began to rise, as from the dead, with new
wounds-articulating a legacy of suffering that linked their wartime expe-
rience, which was the hallmark of the 1960's, to the widespread concern
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about toxic risks to health and safety that has become a singular charac-
teristic of the present decade.
The dramatic story of the veterans' efforts to obtain legal redress for the
multitude of disabilities attributed to toxic poisoning in Vietnam is the
subject of Peter Schuck's case study, Agent Orange on Trial.' But Schuck
has broader intentions as well. Just as no first-rate account of the Viet-
nam War could ignore the role of American political culture and institu-
tions, Schuck's analysis of the Agent Orange litigation is grounded in a
searching examination of the institutional capacity of the tort system to
deal with mass toxics incidents.
I will recount briefly the story of Agent Orange in the courts, as Schuck
tells it. Mainly, however, I want to focus on the broader problems of insti-
tutional structure and process that Schuck takes as his correlative theme.
If the Vietnam War symbolized to many the moral bankruptcy of Ameri-
can post-World War II foreign policy, Agent Orange demonstrates, to my
mind, the intolerable consequences of relying on the tort system in mass
toxic disaster cases. The question, then, is whether a better alternative can
be designed.
I. THE CASE
The origins of the Agent Orange controversy can be traced to the Vet-
erans Administration (VA), where, in 1978, a benefits counselor in the
Chicago regional office raised the possibility of a connection between an
emerging pattern of veterans' illnesses and exposure to Agent Orange, an
herbicide containing trace amounts of dioxin that the Army had sprayed
on jungle warfare zones in Vietnam. After a local TV station broadcast a
special report on her findings, claims based on a variety of illnesses, dis-
eases and genetically transmitted birth defects began to arise. Apart from
a non-serious skin condition known as chloracne, the VA routinely re-
jected these claims on the grounds that they were not "service-connected,"
the required nexus under the statutory benefit program.2
Before long, Agent Orange cases were in the courts. As the number of
claims against a handful of chemical manufacturers of the product began
to swell, the parties successfully petitioned the federal Judicial Multidis-
trict Litigation Panel to consolidate the cases in Federal District Court in
New York where it was assigned to Judge George Pratt.3 For the next
1. P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (enlarged
ed. 1987) [hereinafter by page number only].
2. For a brief description of the VA benefits program, see Rabin, Preclusion of Judicial Review
in the Processing of Claims for Veterans' Benefits: A Preliminary Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 905
(1975).
3. Interestingly, the veterans did not choose to join the U.S. government as a defendant in their
suits. Undoubtedly, the Feres doctrine, Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), was a key reason
for their lack of enthusiasm. Feres created blanket governmental immunity in cases of military service-
related tort suits on a variety of grounds, principally the need to show due regard for military disci-
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four and one half years, Judge Pratt worked at what can most charitably
be described as an inconstant pace in an effort to impose a semblance of
pre-trial order on a controversy that posed daunting issues of class certifi-
cation, notice, statute of limitations, choice of law, causation, governmen-
tal immunity, government contractor status, and damages, just to mention
the principal complexities.
As Schuck describes it, Judge Pratt appears to have initially moved in
fairly decisive fashion to make the government contractor defense the cen-
terpiece of pre-trial discovery." Under his view of that defense, the chemi-
cal companies would have been immune from suit if they could establish
that the government had at least as much knowledge about the health
risks of Agent Orange as the military contractor did.' At a later date,
however, the judge came to recognize that the comparative knowledge is-
sues raised by the defense were so inextricably intertwined with other is-
sues in the case-principally, whether dioxin in fact posed human health
risks at low levels of exposure-that his strategy collapsed like a house of
cards. At that point, the litigation began to drift in an alarming fashion,
until, fortuitously, Judge Pratt was appointed to the court of appeals.
Enter Judge Jack Weinstein, who immediately took command of center
stage in the unfolding drama. At his first meeting with the parties, Judge
Weinstein seized the initiative, announcing a trial date only six months
later and redefining the issues-putting causation at the center of the
case-in a way that struck terror in the hearts of all concerned. And he
never faltered, combining unpredictability and boldness with considerable
imagination. Unfazed by the Second Circuit's refusal (in an earlier rever-
sal of a Judge Pratt ruling) to mandate the applicability of federal law to
the case,' Judge Weinstein discerned a "national consensus law" among
the states that achieved the same result.7 Undaunted by the obstacles to a
mass tort class action, he enunciated a "representative" test case approach,
developed a strategy for providing notice to far-flung veterans, and fash-
ioned an opt-out alternative for recalcitrant claimants. When the Army
pline. Schuck reports that the veterans were also reluctant to cast aspersions on the government's
conduct because by doing so they would be impugning their sense of loyalty to the country.
The chemical companies, however, had no such compunctions, and, for a variety of strategic rea-
sons, sought to join the government as a third-party defendant-despite Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v.
United States, 431 U.S. 666, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 882 (1977), which extended Feres immunity to
the end-run prospect of such third-party situations.
4. See pp. 67-71.
5. See pp. 61-62, 81-82. As Pratt subsequently articulated the defense, the companies would also
have been required to show that they supplied a product that met governmentally-established
specifications.
6. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom.,
Chapman v. Dow Chem. Co., 454 U.S. 1128 (1981). Under the Second Circuit's ruling, the basis for
a federal forum would have been diversity jurisdiction, and, as a consequence, the choice-of-law
problems would have been nightmarish; indeed, the court could well have been faced with interpreting
the product liability laws of every state and applying them accordingly.
7. See pp. 128-31.
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insisted on its military command immunity under the Feres doctrine,8 he
devised an independent theory of government liability to aggrieved spouses
and after-born children. When the plaintiffs' lawyers evinced a determi-
nation to go to trial, he opined that their case on causation might not
survive summary judgment. At the same time, when the chemical compa-
nies showed signs of stonewalling, he raised the specter of crippled and
maimed veterans appearing before a sympathetic jury.
From the outset, Judge Weinstein appears to have been unwavering in
his single-minded determination to achieve a rapid settlement of the case,
on terms that he regarded as equitable to both sides in the controversy,
and, in the eleventh hour, he succeeded. Drawing on a battery of settle-
ment masters, and resorting alternatively to cajoling and admonishing the
parties, he was able to announce-after a marathon weekend of negotia-
tions-an agreement to settle for $180 million before dawn on the May 7,
1984 trial date.
In his subsequent "fairness opinion" evaluating the settlement, which
he had in essence imposed upon the parties, Judge Weinstein proceeded
both to outline a bold foundation for litigating mass toxic tort claims like
Agent Orange-based on proportional liability of "indeterminate" defend-
ants and probabilistic recovery for "indeterminate" plaintiffs-and to le-
gitimate the settlement in the present case on the grounds that causation,
among other issues, was so attenuated.' Subsequently, he unveiled a dis-
tribution plan that, as amended and with accumulated interest, set aside
$150 million for cash payments to claimants who died or suffered from
exposure to Agent Orange, and earmarked $45 million for an endowed
fund to address the future needs of afflicted veterans and their offspring
suffering from birth defects. Agent Orange was history-apart from an
appeal that upheld the settlement.10
This brief description of the pre-trial handling and disposition of the
case cannot do justice to the staggering array of substantive and proce-
8. See supra note 3.
9. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), af/'d, 818
F.2d 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 695 (1987). "Proportional," or market share, liability was
recognized in the widely-noted case of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924,
163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), involving claims against the manufacturers of DES-none of whom could
be identified as the supplier of the precise product ingested by a claimant's mother during pregnancy.
"Probabilistic recovery" anticipates an extension of Sindell from the situation where the particular
defendant cannot be identified, to a scenario in which the plaintiff is "indeterminate" in the sense that
the background risks of contracting a particular disease have been enhanced by the claimant's expo-
sure to defendant's toxic product. In this situation, each victim would recover damages discounted by
the risk enhancement factor associated with the product. See Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort
Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REv. 713 (1982).
10. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 695
(1987). The Second Circuit relied heavily on the government contractor defense in upholding the
settlement. In a recent decision, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated a broad version of the defense
that would make military contractors immune from suit in design defect cases as long as the supplier
warned of dangers known to the supplier but not to the government and met the conditions mentioned
supra note 5. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988).
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dural issues raised in Agent Orange, let alone the complexities confronted
by Judge Pratt, and later Judge Weinstein, in dealing with an army of
contentious lawyers. Schuck is consistently lucid, insightful, and fair-
minded in his portrayal of this exceedingly elaborate tale. But he also has
large aims, and if I have been somewhat sparing in my account, it is
because I share his view that Agent Orange warrants evaluation more
broadly as a chapter in the unfolding saga of toxic torts in the judicial
system.
II. THE TORT SYSTEM: AN ASSESSMENT
As I indicated earlier, the Agent Orange case-despite the bold imagi-
nation, and sometimes breathtaking legerdemain of Judge Wein-
stein-depicts a tort system that was institutionally inadequate for dealing
with the conflicting claims of the Vietnam veterans and the various de-
fendants. Let me elaborate on this rather harsh conclusion by assessing
the tort system's performance according to the traditional mix of goals it is
meant to promote: compensation and vindication of injury victims, deter-
rence of accident-generating conduct, and a tolerable level of administra-
tive cost.'"
A. Compensation and Vindication of Injury Victims
When the initial Agent Orange claims were filed, the case bore a strong
resemblance to classic two-party corrective justice tort litigation. The
claimants sought individualized recovery for harms that they regarded as
identifiable consequences of the indifference, if not greed, of the chemical
companies. Their principal attorney was Victor Yannacone, a lawyer
long-associated with the public interest movement who shared their com-
mitment to holding the manufacturers of toxic products responsible for the
human devastation caused by their perceived heedlessness to risk.
Before long, however, these early players were relegated to the sidelines
and the case took on a distinctly Alice-in-Wonderland (or perhaps
Kafkaesque is the more appropriate metaphor) cast. The scale of the con-
troversy expanded far beyond the resource capacity of any single personal
injury firm. Claimants soon began to appear on a nationwide scale; dis-
covery, as anticipated, would involve a massive coordinated, computerized
effort; expert witnesses, it became clear, would be needed on a vast array
of complex scientific and technological issues. In response to these exigen-
cies, and notwithstanding the consolidation of the individual claims, the
11. Schuck discusses alternative systems for dealing with the mass tort problem in terms of these
same goals, apart from vindication of injury victims. See pp. 277-97. Although compensation and
vindication clearly are distinct goals, they are closely related in a case like Agent Orange in which a
judicial recognition of the victims' claims for redress took on such important symbolic meaning. As a
consequence, I discuss the two functions together.
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plaintiffs' lawyers began to multiply. Before the case was concluded, a
Byzantine network of relationships was developed among financiers, liti-
gators and case management specialists, characterized by intramural bit-
terness and mutual recrimination. At the same time, as the lawyers multi-
plied, the claimants and their ideological commitments receded to the
vanishing point. Indeed, in the final rounds of the pre-trial sparring, as
Schuck describes it, there is no apparent sense in which the Agent Orange
victims felt the least connection to the case.12 If a sense of vindication
bears some relationship to meaningful participation in articulating the na-
ture of one's grievance, Agent Orange can only be regarded as a perver-
sion of the process: As the case dragged on, the activist veterans exper-
ienced a growing sense of alienation. 3
If Agent Orange had taken on a life of its own, it nonetheless moved
inexorably towards its denouement under the masterful hand of Judge
Weinstein. Unlike Judge Pratt, he would not tolerate drift; in contrast to
Congress, the VA and the Justice Department, he refused to treat the
Agent Orange claimants as pariahs. A settlement there would be, and one
that acknowledged the veterans' continuing ordeal. In this spirit, the par-
ties were finally brought to a meeting of the minds at the bargaining table
and a settlement was announced: $180 million and accumulating interest
was allocated to long-term total disability awards to exposed veterans, to
death benefits for the families of deceased veterans, and to a fund for the
"future needs" of veterans and their children with birth defects.
From a compensation perspective, one can hardly be sanguine about
this outcome. At the conclusion of the case, Schuck reported that the prin-
cipal fund was expected to yield awards of $3,400 to death benefit claim-
ants and $12,800 to the permanently disabled. 4 Four years later, when
the final appeals had been taken, the special master's revised estimate was
that the average survivor's benefit would be $1,800 and the average per-
manent disability award would come to $5,700.15 Furthermore, these
awards have to be evaluated in the context of a case that was concluded
nine years after the initial claims had been filed. Without denigrating the
value of a purely symbolic transfer of funds to the veterans, it is difficult
to see these awards in any other light. By no contemporaneous standard of
12. See pp. 255-56.
13. This sense of alienation was perhaps most vividly conveyed in the series of informal "fairness
hearings" held by Judge Weinstein in a number of cities after the settlement was announced. See pp.
173-78.
14. See p. 220.
15. See Weinstein Wraps Up Agent Orange Case, 200 N.Y.L.J. 1, 3 (1988). A court-ordered
analysis of the 250,000 claims concluded that 30,800 veterans would qualify for liability awards, and
18,100 surviving families would be eligible for death benefits. Id. at 3. The distribution of the second-




fairness could they be regarded as approximating the economic value of
long-term disability or death."6
Closer scrutiny of the settlement process serves to underscore this reac-
tion. As Schuck points out, the $180 million figure seems to represent
little more than a number that intuitively appealed to Judge Weinstein as
the fair price-tag on the controversy.17 At first glance, this outcome is
troublesome because the parties apparently were mutually receptive to set-
tling at a considerably higher figure.
But the matter cuts much deeper. In reality, the case appears to have
been in such a state of disarray, even after five years of pre-trial maneu-
vering, that no one had a clear idea of the number of seriously disabled
claimants in the class or the character and extent of their injuries. In other
words, there had been, as yet, no systematic categorization of the inci-
dence, magnitude and type of claims being made, no breakdown of the
patterns of exposure experienced by individual claimants, and no particu-
larized genetic and environmental case histories of the veterans. Under the
circumstances, the $180 million figure bore no intelligible relationship to
the probability of success in the litigation, let alone to any rational esti-
mate of economic or intangible loss actually suffered by the claimants; it
was a dollar amount-like the negotiating figures staked out by the attor-
neys-simply picked out of the air. Can a serious argument be made for
such a compensation process?
B. Deterrence of Accident-Generating Conduct
In the tort system, compensation and deterrence are two sides of the
same coin. The accident costs associated with a particular activity signal to
the defendant the rational amount to spend on accident prevention in or-
der to reach the optimum level of operations.' 8 In the Agent Orange set-
tlement, the chemical manufacturers (and, in fact, their insurers) were
assessed a share of the final dollar agreement based on product volume
weighted for the dioxin content of their particular output. From a deter-
rence perspective, one might ask what signals were transmitted to the
manufacturers about the appropriate level of future investment in safe-
guards against toxic exposure.
The earlier discussion of the compensatory function of the $180 million
award provides a partial answer. If the award bore no discernible rela-
tionship to any dimension of the case other than Judge Weinstein's ge-
stalt-like sense of a fair figure that the parties could be induced to accept,
Agent Orange has no rational deterrent value for future cases. In fact, a
16. This is without reference to the massive administrative costs involved in setting these award
levels. See infra Section II(0).
17. See p. 159.
18. The classic treatment of the subject is G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF AcCIDMs (1970).
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closer examination of the case supports this conclusion. Under Judge
Pratt, the case might well have languished for three or four more years
with an indeterminate outcome at the end of that period. Under still an-
other judge, the case might well have never been certified as a class action
in the first instance. The singular nature, in other words, of Judge Wein-
stein's intervention in the case is the most substantial factor undermining
its deterrent value. It is simply impossible to separate out his highly indi-
vidualized assessment and evaluation of the case from its final outcome,
and, as a consequence, it offers no real signal about appropriate future
levels of investment in safety.
Indeed, Judge Weinstein's strong intimation that the claimants had no
case on causation, coupled with his subsequent summary judgment against
the opt-out plaintiffs on the same ground, underscores a more fundamen-
tal point. 9 As long as scientific understanding of the toxicity of various
synthetic products remains so rudimentary, the existing frontiers of
knowledge provide virtually no guidance on the incidence and magnitude
of harm from new chemical products; and, as a result, judges and juries
have almost unlimited discretion in determining causation.
In this milieu, there is very little in accumulated experience that a
chemical producer can apply from an assessment of liability for one new
synthetic product to an outlay for risk-reducing research and development
on another, particularly in a world where the effects of present invest-
ment/production decisions are not likely to become manifest until ten or
twenty years into the future. As far as I can tell, no serious argument can
be made that Agent Orange promoted the goal of optimal risk-prevention.
C. Administrative Costs
The bottom line figures speak for themselves: A five year process of
pre-trial maneuvering, negotiating and appeals, involving administrative
costs far exceeding $100 million dollars, to arrive at a final settlement of
$180 million cannot help but trigger questions about the system in which
the controversy was resolved.2" These are not new questions. Indeed, the
19. Judge Weinstein's opt-out opinion is found in Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y.
1985).
20. In fact, I am offering an extraordinarily conservative figure on administrative costs. Schuck
reports the following:
The plaintiffs are represented by a network of law firms that numbered almost 1,500 by May
1984, located in every region of the country; the documented cost of their activities to date
certainly exceeds $10 million and increases daily. It has been estimated that the defendants
spent roughly $100 million merely to prepare for the trial, utilizing hundreds of lawyers and
corporate staff in their Herculean effort.
P. 5.
Schuck's figures are not meant to take into account litigation costs associated with the fairness
hearings, formulation of the distribution plan, or four additional years of appeals. While it can be
argued that the latter step, judicial appeals, also might be taken from any alternative administrative
forum designated to hear a mass toxics case, the Second Circuit's 200-plus page opinion, involving
nine separate opinions on discrete questions of law by the three judge panel, vividly illustrates how
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contemporaneous Rand studies of the mass tort asbestos litigation, indicat-
ing a 39/61 ratio of payouts to administrative costs, have been frequently
cited by critics of the tort system.2 More generally, it is widely recognized
that even the resolution of a classic two-party negligence case, involving
determinations of fault, causation, and individualized damages, is an ex-
pensive mechanism for allocating losses when compared to no-fault and
social insurance schemes.22
Schuck's account provides a vivid illustration of just how costly a mass
toxic tort case can be. In Agent Orange, the defendants had every incen-
tive to use delay as a strategic measure to impose heavy pre-trial litigation
costs on the plaintiffs in the hope of exhausting their resources. Moreover,
the law firms representing the defendants had minimal incentives to cut
costs or economize on billings to their corporate clients. On the plaintiffs'
side, the financial demands of the enterprise rose precipitously as the scale
of the case expanded. There was a pressing need to research and brief a
seemingly unending succession of legal issues, ranging from procedural
questions about class action certification to substantive matters such as the
government contractor defense. In addition, there were the ever-present
demands of conducting pre-trial discovery. And in conjunction with dis-
covery there was a corresponding need for expert witnesses representing a
laundry list of technical areas including, according to Schuck, specialists in
"biochemistry, toxicology, epidemiology, internal medicine, statistics, on-
cology, occupational medicine, genetics, immunology, neurology and plant
physiology."23
On both sides, a veritable army of lawyers and support personnel
geared up for battle. Indeed, Judge Weinstein was keenly aware of the
unique institutional demands that would be placed on the court itself, if a
settlement were to be effected. Almost immediately after his assignment to
the case, he took the singular step of appointing three masters to assist
him in devising a strategy for effecting its resolution.
There is a danger of losing sight of the ultimate burdens these costs
impose. The attorneys' fees and expert witness costs of the plaintiffs are
perhaps most visible, since they eventually were deducted from the com-
pensatory award to the Agent Orange claimants. The defense expendi-
tures presumably were incorporated into the chemical manufacturers'
overall costs of doing business. The extraordinary outlays on court man-
agement were borne, in part, by the defendants, as well as by the taxpay-
time-consuming and costly an appeal from the tort system is when compared to any conceivable ad-
ministrative compensation scheme. I consider the comparative institutional questions in greater detail,
infra Section III(B).
21. See, in particular, J. KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FEsSTINEsR, G. HAGGSTROM & M. SHAN-
LEY, VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND ExPENsES xvii-xix (1984).
22. For a comprehensive empirical study of the costs of the tort system, see J. KAKALIK & N.
PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION (1986).
23. P. 140.
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ing public. The important, and perhaps self-evident, point is that these
massive costs do not just disappear; they are a part of the high price of
resolving toxic tort disputes through the courts, as compared to other rep-
24aration delivery systems.
Arguably, the price might be nonetheless worth bearing, if the system
were achieving high marks for its execution of the compensatory and de-
terrence functions. As we have seen, however, it has been a dismal failure
on both those scores. As a consequence, we face two logical follow-up
questions. If Agent Orange depicts a tort system in disrepair, is it repre-
sentative of the prospects for judicial resolution of mass toxics cases? And
if it is, does a better alternative exist?
III. AGENT ORANGE AND THE NEED TO MOVE BEYOND TORT
A. Representativeness
Every mass toxic tort case has its own unique features. In this regard,
Agent Orange was distinctive because the problem of establishing dioxin
exposure in individual cases would have been virtually insoluble. Al-
though the Army did maintain records indicating where Agent Orange
had been sprayed, it would have been a hopeless task to pinpoint the resi-
due in a particular area on a specified calendar date and link that poten-
tial exposure data with the movements of a particular veteran in the jun-
gle during the same period. Indeed, Judge Weinstein amended the final
settlement distribution order to include within the principal beneficiary
class totally disabled veterans who could establish any exposure, in recog-
nition of the attenuated case for specific causation.
Clearly, the Agent Orange controversy was also exceptional because of
its origins in the traumatic war in Vietnam. The contextual setting of the
case created an emotional and ideological overlay that colored every aspect
of the controversy, including the initial characterization of the case by an
activist attorney, the growing sense of alienation of the claimant class, and
the eventual resolution by an empathetic judge. Without the badge of ser-
24. Consider the following analysis in Sand, How Much is Enough? Observations in Light of the
Agent Orange Settlement, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 283 (1985), discussing the reasons why such a
case is likely to run into the tens of millions in litigation costs:
By way of illustration, in the Agent Orange litigation, solely with respect to the government
contract defense, the defendants took more than 200 depositions of former or current govern-
ment employees. Assume that the depositions were performed by outside counsel and that each
deposition took two days. Assume that the defendants' counsel each spent one day preparing
for each deposition and another day summarizing and reviewing. Assume that the law firms
used teams of two attorneys with an hourly billing rate for each attorney of $150. The calcula-
tion begins with: 200 depositions x 4 days x 8 hours = 6400 hours. The next step is 6400
hours x 14 attorneys (2 for each defendant) x $150 per hour = a total cost for attorneys of
$13,440,000 for deposition costs for this aspect of the suit, leaving out transcript fees, travel
costs, and other expenses. This cost would be multiplied several times over in the taking of




vice to the country in Vietnam, the arguments for class certification, appli-
cation of national consensus law, and utilization of a workers' compensa-
tion-like distributional scheme would have been even more highly
controversial.
Despite these distinctive characteristics, Schuck seems correct in con-
cluding that the case has larger lessons for mass toxics litigation. Let me
develop the point by drawing on an earlier essay, where I defined the
singular difficulties of environmental torts as problems of identification,
boundaries and source.25 In that essay, I designated problems of identifi-
cation as the distinctive difficulties the tort system faces in relying on
probabilistic evidence (epidemiological data, animal studies, and the like)
to isolate harm caused by long-latent toxics from other background risks
of living. I referred to problems of boundaries as the array of bizarre
pathological disorders, in utero injuries, and genetic defects that generate
singular complexities in projecting and assessing harm in mass toxics liti-
gation. Finally, I defined as problems of sourci the situations where mul-
tiple producers or emitters of a toxic substance each contribute to the
harmful exposure, but often in a way that is difficult to isolate from the
aggregate.
Clearly, the Agent Orange controversy possessed each of these charac-
teristics. The problem of "general" causation that haunted the case from
beginning to end, as distinguished from the even more problematic issue of
specific exposure of individual veterans, was attributable to the claimants'
inability to demonstrate persuasively that the array of pathological disor-
ders they experienced in fact could be attributed to Agent Orange expo-
sure. Correspondingly, the wide variety of disorders experienced by the
veterans and their family members posed great uncertainty about the
eventual size of the class as well as ongoing problems of diagnosis and
assessment. Finally, the substantial variations in dioxin content among the
Agent Orange producers raised troublesome questions regarding equitable
apportionment of responsibility. On each of these dimensions, Agent
Orange resembled the emerging scenario of mass toxics litigation, which
contrasts so sharply with the broken bones and smashed skulls that consti-
tute the fodder of ordinary tort suits.
As a consequence, the Agent Orange controversy generated the now-
familiar institutional challenges that mass toxics disasters have posed for a
tort system designed to achieve corrective justice in two-party accident
cases: proof problems centered on long latency and probabilistic causation,
presentation problems posed by reliance on expert witnesses, catastrophic
loss issues related to unforeseeable incidence and magnitude of harm, and
responsibility-assignment issues grounded in isolating the source of harm.
25. See Rabin, Environmental Liability and the Tort System, 24 Hous. L. REV. 27, 29-33
(1987).
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In addition, the internal problems of coordination and consensus encoun-
tered by both groups of attorneys, while perhaps exacerbated on the plain-
tiffs' side by the exigencies of class action case management, sounded a
familiar note.
Again, it is essential to realize where these distinctive features of mass
toxics litigation, as illustrated by Agent Orange, lead. One consequence is
uncertain compensation: in Agent Orange, tort awards that can only be
regarded as a symbolic gesture, unrelated to any serious assessment of
proof of harm. Another consequence is haphazard deterrence: in Agent
Orange, tort assessments that came twenty years after production and of-
fered no intelligible signal about the likelihood or magnitude of liability
for unrelated toxic products in the future. A third consequence is intolera-
ble delay: in Agent Orange, appellate review that was concluded more
than nine years after the initial claims were filed. A final consequence is
massive administrative costs: in Agent Orange, lawyers' fees, expert wit-
ness expenses, court costs, and related outlays that most likely match more
than dollar-for-dollar the size of the aggregate award distributed to the
claimant class. One cannot but ask, is there no better way to run the
railroad?
B. Alternatives
In his concluding chapters, Schuck offers his thoughts on the search for
better alternatives to the traditional tort system.26 He initially discusses a
public law tort model, outlined in a 1984 article by David Rosenberg,
which would reconstitute the way the tort system handles mass toxics
cases in recognition of their special characteristics. The model would rely
on class action treatment of the claims, resort to probabilistic determina-
tions of causation, allocate liability proportionally among defendants, as-
sess scheduled damages, and adopt a variety of other strategies necessi-
tated by the "public" dimensions of the cases.
It is immediately apparent that this reconstruction of tort law is not
really an alternative to the Agent Orange approach. In essence, Judge
Weinstein adopted a public law model, acknowledging the hopeless fit be-
tween a two-party corrective justice approach and a modern toxics case.
As my earlier discussion indicates, however, I regard Agent Orange as a
disheartening comment on the model in practice. All of the imaginative
techniques turned sour as the case came to be characterized by intramural
wrangling among the "teams" of attorneys, interminable briefing of tech-
26. See pp. 255-97.
27. See Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of
the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851 (1984).
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nical legal issues, wholesale arbitrariness in determining damages, and
calculated obfuscation of the causation issue.28
The problem is fundamental. The public law model assumes an early
warning system for class consolidation that would eliminate procedural
wrangles, an organizational strategy that would abolish internecine war-
fare among the attorneys, advances in scientific understanding that would
give meaning to probabilistic causation, and, at the threshold, a bold and
imaginative judge. On every count, there is slim hope for translating these
demands from theory into practice.
The alternative is to seek a solution outside the tort system. Indeed,
Judge Weinstein's instinct appeared to run strongly in this direction.
Whenever the opportunity presented itself, he lectured the government
lawyers on the responsibilities that Congress, the VA and the Justice De-
partment owed to the Agent Orange veterans. Moreover, the distribution
scheme he eventually adopted resembles less the traditional model of tort
damages than it does a workers' compensation benefits schedule.
Schuck seems similarly disposed to abandon tort. In his final chapter,
devoted to a discussion of non-tort alternatives, he suggests that, political
constraints aside, the mass toxics problem might best be handled outside
the tort system:
For exposures that entail the kind of causal indeterminacy, scale,
spatial and temporal dispersion, and cost exhibited by the Agent Or-
ange case, the law should look primarily to nontort techniques of
deterrence, compensation, and dispute resolution. It should stress
regulatory standards supported by improved risk information, en-
hanced public and private enforcement of these standards, a re-
formed workers' compensation scheme for occupational exposures,
and expanded private or social first-party insurance of economic
losses from nonoccupational exposures. Private insurers should be
subrogated to victims' claims; if the victims' compensation came from
public funds, a tax should be imposed, assessed as directly on the
risk-generating activity as the determinacy of causality and the po-
tential for effective deterrence permit. In either case, alternative
nontort techniques for dispute resolution should be encouraged for
settling the issues that remain. 9
Like every aspect of Agent Orange, however, the search for an alterna-
tive outside the tort system turns out to be exceedingly complex. Indeed,
even Judge Weinstein's repeated remonstrance that the case was really the
government's responsibility seems highly problematic. Judge Weinstein, in
fact, subsequently granted summary judgment in the opt-out cases on the
28. Ironically, I am not certain that Judge Weinstein had any better alternative than to wind up
the case as quickly as possible at a modest settlement figure, given the lack of any alternative forum
for redress and the expectations generated by five years of litigation and media coverage.
29. P. 296.
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ground that the veterans had failed to demonstrate a sufficient case on
causation to warrant submission to a jury."0 If he was correct in asserting
that the epidemiological data and animal studies failed to establish a link
between the veterans' injuries and Agent Orange exposure, it is unclear
why the VA should have reached a different conclusion-particularly
when its task was to decide case-by-case, poorly documented claims of
exposure. While this view may seem harsh, it is an inexorable conse-
quence of the agency's mandate to award benefits for service-connected
disabilities. Obviously, Congress could provide reparation for all disabled
veterans, regardless of cause, but it has not chosen to do so.
There is a more fundamental point here. In the 1960's, tort scholars
debated the respective attributes of the negligence and no-fault approaches
in auto accident cases.3" As the decade wore on, and throughout the
1970's, the dialogue shifted to the comparative merits of strict liability and
negligence as approaches in defective product cases.32 In the 1980's, the
focus of theoretical interest as well as public awareness has shifted from
consumer product injuries to mass toxic harms, and the terms of conten-
tion must shift correspondingly, in my view, to focus on the tension be-
tween no-fault and social insurance." If our horizons stretch no further
than the no-fault model, grounded in the dominant influence of the work-
ers' compensation regime, a causal nexus stands as a prerequisite to recov-
ery, and the VA's responsibility to the Agent Orange claimants remains
indeterminate at best. Only when disability becomes a sufficient condition
for reparation-in other words, when a social insurance model is
adopted-are the causal issues put to rest.
Moreover, even if the VA had found the requisite causal connection,
there is every reason to think that processing mass toxics claims through
an administrative compensation system would entail substantial costs and
delay. Whatever the forum, the requirement of an established nexus be-
30. See In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. 1223 (1985).
31. See, e.g., R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM
(1965); Blum & Kalven, The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi: Auto Accidents and General Deter-
rence, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 239 (1965); Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law
Problem-Auto Compensation Plans, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 641 (1964); Calabresi, Fault, Accidents,
and the Wonderful World of Blum & Kalven, 75 YALE L.J. 216 (1965).
32. See, e.g., Calabresi & Hirschoff, Towards a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055 (1972); Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973).
33. In fact, tort reform advocates in the world of practical politics carefully avoid the hornets' nest
of mass toxic torts and continue to address less intractable problems involving two-party accidents.
See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP: AN UPDATE ON THE LIABILITY
CRISIS 65-73 (1987) (describing state legislative reforms enacted in 1985-86); REPORT OF THE ABA
ACTION COMMISSION TO IMPROVE THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM (1987); REPORT OF THE TORT
POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT
CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY (1986) (federal inter-agency study spon-
sored by Attorney General). But evidence of rising interest in the no-fault/social insurance issue can
be found in the academic literature. See, e.g., Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsi-
bility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. 845 (1987); Rabin, supra note 25;
Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 559 (1985).
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tween harm and source necessitates reliance on scientific studies, extensive
case histories, and data interpretation by a battery of specialized profes-
sionals. An agency's institutional capacity for determining these issues
may surpass the judicial process, but it is still likely to be a costly
enterprise.
Venturing beyond the confines of Agent Orange, the thicket grows even
more dense if no-fault remains the dominant model."4 In contrast to the
clearly definable veterans' class, an administrative benefits scheme for tox-
ics victims would raise serious definitional issues. Would coverage be de-
fined, for example, in terms that included both drug and hazardous waste
victims? These are two quite distinct categories of risk that, nonetheless,
impose similar strains on the tort process. More generally, how would a
class of beneficiaries be designated that comported with notions of funda-
mental fairness and frontiers of epidemiological research? How would ap-
propriate standards be established for determining exposure? Which,
among the extraordinarily wide-ranging sources of toxic substances,
would be required to contribute (and according to what formula) to the
funding mechanism? These are only some of the many issues of fairness
and efficiency that would need to be addressed if a no-fault alternative to
the tort system were under serious consideration."5
By contrast, a social insurance model obviates the need to resolve many
of these questions. Since eligibility for reparation rests exclusively on
proof of disability, the system is liberated from the daunting requirement
of isolating a responsible source in a world of background risks. Correla-
tively, the universality of coverage eliminates the need to draw lines
among classes of claimants experiencing like disabilities. In addition, there
is no longer a rationale for linking the funding mechanism to the risk-
generating activities of identified sources. For these reasons, the search for
non-tort alternatives generated by Agent Orange and its family of related
mass tort episodes seems to lead naturally from no-fault to social
insurance.
Unfortunately, the merits are not so easily resolved. The social insur-
ance model generates its own issues of fairness and efficiency. Abandoning
the tort system involves a trade-off of individualized treatment according
to corrective justice norms-with particular emphasis on the assessment of
intangible loss-for routinized, universal coverage under categorical rules
34. For a discussion of the workers' compensation context, see Locke, Adapting Workers' Com-
pensation to the Special Problems of Occupational Disease, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 249 (1985).
35. For detailed toxic compensation plan proposals, see Superfund Section 301(e) Study Group,
Injuries and Damages from Hazardous Waste-Analysis and Improvement of Legal Remedies, A
Report to Congress in Compliance with Section 301(e) of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Senate Comm. on Environmental & Public Works,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 1982); Trauberman, Statutory Reform of Toxic Torts: Relieving Legal,
Scientific, and Economic Burdens on the Chemical Victim, 7 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 177 (1983). For
further discussion of the issues discussed in the text, see Abraham, supra note 33.
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of eligibility. In effecting this exchange, the American approach, to the
extent that it has opted for no-fault, can best be described as pragmatic. 38
No-fault systems have been adopted selectively, particularly in the indus-
trial injury and auto accident areas, as focused concerns about the efficacy
of the tort system have arisen.37 Even so, critics have questioned the fair-
ness of carving out designated categories of accident victims for special
treatment.38
But the social insurance model is far bolder in design. Agent Orange
victims would be compensated because of the types of disorders they ex-
perienced-the various forms of cancer, liver ailment, psychological im-
pairment, genetic defect and skin disease-without reference to the cir-
cumstances under which those pathologies arose. By definition, universal
coverage based on such disabilities would be the norm. Thus, the tort sys-
tem would be replaced or relegated to a minor residual role, and the acci-
dent victims' claims for individualized recognition of their misfortune
would no longer be honored. While reform on this scale may be war-
ranted, it should be the consequence of a comprehensive analysis of the
fairness and efficacy of the tort system, not a result of the mass toxics
problem standing alone.
Moreover, the social insurance model is not responsive to the goal of
optimal accident prevention. If the tort system were displaced, a finely-
tuned regulatory system would be essential to control against undue risks
generated by the industrial and service sectors of our dynamic economy;
otherwise, efficient resource allocation would be ignored entirely. As a
matter of realpolitik, this is no small undertaking. The political will to
enact, let alone implement, plenary safety regulation based on comprehen-
sive risk-utility analysis has not been historically evident in this country.
At this point, we have come a long way from Agent Orange simply to
venture onto uncertain terrain. I have suggested that the case itself illus-
trates the futility of adapting the tort system to the demands of mass toxics
claimants. Yet, the treatment of mass tort "victimization" as a manifesta-
tion of a universal need for reparation and sustenance of the disabled
raises corresponding concerns about indiscriminate denial of claims for in-
dividualized treatment of human suffering, as well as concerns about po-
tential indifference to preventing conduct that is excessively dangerous.
The middle-ground represented by no-fault benefit models, in turn, has its
36. The most far-reaching American programs adopting the social insurance model are Social
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Medicare. Each program, however, is subject to significant
limitations; in the first case, eligibility is limited to cases involving total disability, and, in the second
instance, the program is primarily limited to medical assistance for the elderly.
37. There are other, more narrowly focused examples as well. See, e.g., The Black Lung Benefits
Act, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 901 et. seq. (1986); The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 201 et. seq. (1986).
38. See, e.g., Blum & Kalven, Ceilings, Costs, and Compulsion in Auto Compensation Legisla-
tion, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 341.
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own treacherous pathways; in particular, the re-introduction of vexing in-
quiries into causal nexus.
Schuck offers a considered analysis of these alternatives, and while he
expresses a clear preference for a non-tort system that combines compen-
sation for economic loss with optimal risk-reducing regulatory standards,
he cautiously supports the public law tort model until more far-reaching
reform is politically feasible. I have no quarrel with this assessment, since
some forum must be open to those who have colorable claims to having
suffered serious disability from toxic exposure. But I find the specter of
Agent Orange in the courts so appalling-and, in like fashion, on more
impressionistic evidence, the long journey of asbestos and Dalkon Shield
claimants from the tort system into the bankruptcy courts sufficiently dis-
couraging-that continuing resort to the tort system in these mass toxics
cases seems indefensible."9
When process costs become the dominant characteristic of a system
designed to allocate liability on corrective justice principles, tort law has
lost it bearings. When closer inquiry suggests that the system is no longer
even pursuing corrective justice ends, tort law has lost its raison d'etre as
well. Whatever its imperfections, a focused no-fault scheme, funded
through contributions on an enterprise liability basis and providing eco-
nomic loss to defined categories of claimants, at least holds the promise of
resolving complex causation issues without recreating a lawyers' stage
drama of endless motions, briefs, discovery and negotiations.4"
The war in Vietnam left an indelible legacy of doubt and discontent
about the sensibility of our political institutions. A similar lesson might
well be drawn from Agent Orange in the tort system.
39. For a discussion of the asbestos cases, see D. HENSLER, W. FELSTINER, M. SELVIN & P.
EBENER, ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS Toxic TORTS (1985); J. KAKALIK,
P. EBENER, W. FESTINER, G. HAGGSTROM & M. SHANLEY, supra note 21. Some of the problems
generated by the Dalkon Shield bankruptcy reorganization are described in Lawyers Say Robins Plan
Has Approval of Creditors, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1988, at D1, col. 1.
40. In recent years, Congress has adopted focused no-fault schemes addressed to vaccine-related
injuries and coal miners' occupational diseases. See references, supra note 37. These schemes have not
been immune from criticism, and do not, in any event, supply a ready blueprint for a broader no-fault
plan that would carve out a designated compensable event coextensive with the mass toxics problem. A
satisfying statutory definition of toxic harm would have to be sufficiently open-ended to incorporate
new scientific findings on chemical substances that posed serious health risks, and, at the same time,
would need to be adequately focused to avoid protracted disputes over a variety of causation issues.
While I regard such an approach as worth pursuing, there is clearly no simple solution to the mass
tort problem.
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